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Abstract—Intrusion detection system (IDS) is an important
part of enterprise security system architecture. In particular,
anomaly-based IDS has been widely applied to detect abnormal
process behaviors that deviate from the majority. However,
such abnormal behavior usually consists of a series of low-
level heterogeneous events. The gap between the low-level events
and the high-level abnormal behaviors makes it hard to infer
which single events are related to the real abnormal activities,
especially considering that there are massive “noisy” low-level
events happening in between. Hence, the existing work that
focus on detecting single entities/events can hardly achieve high
detection accuracy. Different from previous work, we design and
implement GID, an efficient graph-based intrusion detection
technique that can identify abnormal event sequences from a
massive heterogeneous process traces with high accuracy. GID
first builds a compact graph structure to capture the interactions
between different system entities. The suspiciousness or anomaly
score of process paths is then measured by leveraging random
walk technique to the constructed acyclic directed graph. To
eliminate the score bias from the path length, the Box-Cox power
transformation based approach is introduced to normalize the
anomaly scores so that the scores of paths of different lengths
have the same distribution. The efficiency of suspicious path
discovery is further improved by the proposed optimization
scheme. We fully implement our GID algorithm and deploy
it into a real enterprise security system, and it greatly helps
detect the advanced threats, and optimize the incident response.
Executing GID on system monitoring datasets showing that GID
is efficient (about 2 million records per minute) and accurate
(higher than 80% in terms of detection rate).
Keywords-Enterprise security system; intrusion detection;
graph modeling; anomaly detection; random walk; path search-
ing
I. INTRODUCTION
With computers and networked systems playing indispens-
able roles in almost every aspect of modern world of society
such as industry, government, and economy, cyber-security
undoubtedly bears the utmost importance in preserving right
social orders. However, nowadays, serious cyber-attacks still
keep happening, which causes significant financial loss and
public tensions. One example is the leakage of sensitive, high-
profile information from giant marketing establishments or
financial institutions. According to a recent study by Ponemon
Institute and IBM [4], data breaches cost companies an average
of $201 per record in 2014, and the total cost paid by
organizations reaches $5.9 millions.
To guarantee the information security in the network of
computers, an intrusion detection system (IDS) is needed to
keep track of the running status of the entire network and
identify scenarios that are associated with potential attacks or
malicious behaviours. Compared to signature-based methods,
which can only detect attacks for which a signature has
previously been created, anomaly-based intrusion detection
aims at identifying unusual entities, events, or observations
from a running system that deviate from its normal pattern of
behaviours. Detected anomaly patterns can be translated into
critical actionable information that can significantly facilitate
human decision making and mitigate the damage of cyber-
attacks. Towards this end, anomaly-based intrusion detection,
with a variety of algorithms proposed in recent years (e.g.,
[16], [14]), turns out to be a particularly useful tool.
However, building an efficient and accurate anomaly-based
intrusion detection system is still challenging due to the nature
of the system monitoring data. However, building an efficient
and accurate anomaly-based intrusion detection system is still
challenging due to the nature of the system monitoring data.
First, IDS typically deals with a large volume of system event
data (normally more than 10, 000 events per host per second)
to detect possible malicious activities. Second, the variety of
system entity types may necessitate high-dimensional features
in subsequent processing. Such enormous feature space could
easily lead to the problem, coined by Bellman as “the curse
of dimensionality” [2].
More importantly, IDS often relies on a coordinated or
sequential, not independent, action of several system events
to determine what state a given system is in. The system
monitoring data are typically low-level interactions between
various entities (e.g., a program opens a file or connects
to a server) with exact time stamps, while abnormal behav-
iors such as attempted intrusions are higher-level activities
which usually involve multiple different events. For example,
a network attack called Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
is composed of a set of stealthy and continuous computer
hacking processes, by first attempting to gain a foothold in
the environment, then using the compromised systems as
the access into the target network, followed by deploying
additional tools that help fulfill the attack objective. The gap
between the low-level events (e.g., process events) and the
high-level abnormal behaviors (e.g., APT attacks) makes it
hard to infer which events are related to the real abnormal
activities, especially considering that there are massive “noisy”
low-level events happening in between. Hence, the approaches
[23], [27] that identify individual events that confer a given
system state are inappropriate to detect sequences of such
interactions between different events. Therefore, there exists
a vital need for the methods that can detect the sequences of
events that are related to the abnormal activities in an efficient
and accurate way.
To address the aforementioned challenges, in this paper, we
introduce GID, a graph-based intrusion detection algorithm
to capture the interaction behavior among different entities,
which sheds important light on event sequences (or sequence
patterns) that are related to anomalous behavior. A key pro-
posal to achieve this is a compact graph representation that
preserves all useful information from the massive heteroge-
neous system monitoring data. Then, a random-walk based al-
gorithm on this graph is conducted to provide anomaly scores
that quantify the “rareness” or anomaly degree of the event
sequences with regards to the historical data. Existing random-
walk based anomaly detection algorithms (e.g., [6], [7]) can
only be applied to detect single suspicious entities/events. By
introducing the sender and receiver scores, we extend the
random-walk technique to detect suspicious process paths, and
prove its convergence in the directed acyclic graph.
To eliminate the potential score bias from the path length,
we use the Box-Cox power transformation based approach to
normalize the anomaly scores so that the scores of paths of
different lengths have the same distribution. To improve the
detection accuracy, we perform the validation of the suspicious
event sequences to ensure that the abnormal event sequences
are sufficiently deviated from normal ones. We further propose
an optimization scheme by integrating the threshold algorithm
with the detection algorithm to improve the efficiency. We
launch an extensive set of experiments on a testbed that
simulates the real-world attacks on the real enterprise system,
to evaluate the time performance and detection accuracy of
our approach. The results demonstrate that, on an enterprise
surveillance data that contain 440 million system events, GID
is efficient (as much as 2 million records per minute) and
accurate (higher than 80% in terms of detection rate). We fully
implement our GID system and deploy it into a real enterprise
security system, which greatly helps detect advanced threats,
and optimize the incident response.
To summarize, in this paper we make the following contri-
butions:
• We identify an important problem (suspicious process
path discovery) in intrusion detection, and design a com-
pact graph model to preserve all the useful information
from massive system monitoring data;
• We develop a suspicious path discovery algorithm based
on random walk and Box-Cox power transformation. By
introducing the sender and receiver scores, we extend the
random-walk technique to detect suspicious sequences in
the directed acyclic graphs, and prove its convergence;
• We propose a fast optimization technique to avoid check-
ing all candidate paths;
• We apply our algorithm to real enterprise surveillance
data and demonstrate its effectiveness and efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II for-
mally states our problem. Section III discusses our graph-based
intrusion detection approach in detail. Section IV presents
the optimization scheme to improve the efficiency. Section
V provides the experiment results. Section VI discusses the
related work. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the preliminaries of our work. For
the following sections, we assume that the computer system
is UNIX system, for simplicity of discussion.
System Entities. System monitoring data, collected by our
agent, indicates the interactions between a set of system
entities. We consider four different types of system entities:
(1) files, (2) processes, (3) Unix domain sockets (UDSockets),
and (4) Internet sockets (INETSockets). Each type of entities
is associated with a set of attributes. Two types of interactions
between the system entities are considered in this paper: (1)
file accessed by the processes; and (2) communication between
processes. According to the design of modern operating sys-
tems, sockets function as the proxy for different processes
to communicate. Typically, two processes that execute on the
same host communicate with each other via UDSockets, while
processes on different hosts communicate with each other by
INETSockets. Thus, on a single host, the interactions exist
between the following types of entities: (1) processes and
files, (2) processes and processes, (3) processes and sockets
(both UDSockets and INETSockets), and (4) UDSockets and
UDSockets.
System Events. We model the interactions between entities as
system events. Formally, a system event e(nb, nd, t) is a record
contains source entity nb, destination entity nd, a timestamp
t when e happens. nb and nd are different entities from
possibly different types. In computer systems, a heterogeneous
event is a record involving entities of different types such as
the files, processes, Unix domain sockets (UDSockets), and
Internet sockets (INETSockets). And the following types of
entity interactions are allowed in UNIX: (1) processes and
files, (2) processes and processes, (3) processes and sockets
(both UDSockets and INETSockets), and (4) UDSockets and
UDSockets.
System events can be generated at a high frequency (e.g.,
20, 000 events per second). In a modern computer system,
plentiful system events can happen without users’ awareness.
For instance, the Exim process, which is the mail transfer
agent, frequently accesses the /etc/hosts file to check the
mapping between host names and IP addresses.
Event Sequence. System events often happen in a chain. For
instance, process A first opens file F , then reads F , and sends
the content of F to process B. We formulate such chain as
the event sequence. Formally, a sequence of events e1, . . . ,
eℓ−1 that happens in a chain is denoted as S{e1, e2, . . . , eℓ−1},
where ei.nd = ei+1.nb, i.e., ei’s destination entity is the ei+1’s
source entity, and ei.t < ei+1.t for i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ − 1}. The
length of S is ℓ. The timespan of a event sequence is ts =
eℓ−1.t−e1.t. A simplified representation is to denote the event
sequence as S{n1, n2, . . . , nℓ−1, nℓ}, informing that the data
is transmitted from n1 to nℓ, via n2, . . . , nℓ−1 following the
time order.
Abnormal Event Sequence. Most of the abnormal system
behaviors, such as cyber intrusion, spying, and information
stealing, often exploit event sequences to achieve their goals.
Typically these event sequences, not individual events, behave
differently from the regular event sequences (see formal defi-
nition of abnormality in Section III-E). We call those event
sequences that are associated with malicious behaviors as
abnormal event sequences. Abnormal system activities, such
as cyber attacks, often finish in a relatively short time period,
in order to avoid detection. Thus, the timespan of abnormal
event sequences is short as well.
To measure the degree of severity of suspicious event
sequences, we assign a score to each event sequence (the
formulation of anomaly score is in Section III-E).
Intrusion attacks usually complete in a short time period,
in order to avoid getting captured. In other words, only those
events that are temporally close may be utilized in a sequence
by the attacker to commit a cyber crime. Therefore, we mainly
focus on the events in a short time span, instead of search
all the historical events. More formally, our problem can be
defined as follows:
Problem Statement. Given the heterogeneous event data that
contains a set of events E , the user-specified positive integers
ℓ, k, and time window size ∆t, we aim to find the top k
abnormal event sequences in E that include at most ℓ system
events occurring within the time period of ∆t.
There are two major challenges in this problem: (1) How
to define and compute the anomaly score of event sequence
containing multiple heterogeneous entities; and (2) How to
rank the event sequences of different lengths at the same time.
III. ALGORITHM
A. Overview
To address the aforementioned challenges, in this paper,
we propose GID, a graph-based intrusion detection system,
that can find abnormal event sequences from a large number
of heterogeneous event traces. Figure 1 shows the frame-
work of GID. In particular, the graph modeling component
(Section III-B) generates a compact graph that captures the
complex interactions among event entities, aiming to reduce
the computational cost in subsequent analysis components.
The path pattern generation component constructs the patterns
of abnormal event sequences (Section III-C). The candidate
path searching component discovers all the candidate event
sequences that comply with the path patterns by scanning
the graph (Section III-D). From the candidate paths identified,
the suspicious path discovery component discriminates those
abnormal event sequences from those normal ones (Section
III-E). The distinction between abnormal and normal paths is
based on the anomaly scores that measure the “rareness” of
each candidate event sequence compared with the historical
ones. The suspicious path discovery component returns those
paths of top-k anomaly scores as suspicious paths. To further
reduce false alarms, the suspicious path validation component
measures the deviation between the suspicious sequences from
the normal ones, and outputs those sequences as abnormal only
if their deviation is sufficiently large (Section III-F). In the
following sections, we discuss the details of each component.
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Fig. 1. Framework of GID
B. Graph Modeling
The system monitoring data can be massive. For example,
the data collected from a single computer system by monitor-
ing the process interactions in one hour can easily reach 1 GB.
Searching over such massive data is prohibitively expensive
in terms of both time and space. Therefore, we devise a
compact, graph-based representation that can greatly improve
the performance of the detection procedure.
The idea of compact graph design comes from our ob-
servation that the original system surveillance data is often
largely redundant in several ways. First, the redundancy comes
from the attributes, as each event record always contains not
only the involved entities but also the attributes of these
entities. Repeatedly storing the attributes of those entities in
a large number of events introduce significant redundancy.
Second, the redundancy comes from the events as the events
that involve the same entities is always repeatedly saved
(with different time stamps). Third, normally, the abnormal
behaviors, such as intrusion attacks, complete in a short time
window. Therefore, it is not necessary to search the data
outside of the user-defined time window.
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Fig. 2. An example of compact graph model; the red path corresponds to
an abnormal event sequence
Our graph model eliminates redundancies in the data. Given
the data in a time window, we construct a directed graph G =
(V,E, T ), with: (1) V as a set of vertices, each representing
an entity. For enterprise surveillance data (see Section V-A),
each vertex of V belongs to any of the following four types:
files (F ), processes (P ), UDSockets (U ), and INETSockets
(I), namely V = F ∪ P ∪ U ∪ I; (2) E as a set of edges.
For each pair of entities (ni, nj), if there exists any system
event between them, we construct an edge (vi, vj) in the graph,
where vi (vj) corresponds to ni (nj); and (3) T as a set of
time stamps. For any edge (vi, vj), it is possible that it is
associated with multiple timestamps (i.e., the corresponding
event happens multiple times). We use T (vi, vj) to denote the
set of time stamps on which this event has ever happened.
Formally, T (vi, vj) = {e.t|e ∈ E , vi = e.nb and vj =
e.nd}. nb (nd) is the source (destination) entity of e. Given
an event sequence of length ℓ, there is a corresponding path
in G that includes ℓ vertices. In the rest of the paper, we will
use event sequence and path interchangeably.
In this paper, we are interested in only those event sequences
that happen within a given time interval, namely the timespan
is less than or equal to ∆t, where ∆t is a given threshold.
In other words, the graph only records events that happen in
a time window of size ∆t. Figure 2 shows an example of
the compact graph for enterprise surveillance data. Note that
according to the types of entity interactions that are allowed
in UNIX (Section V-A), G is not a complete graph. Instead,
it only allows the edges between (1) process and file nodes,
(2) process and process nodes, (3) process and socket (both
UDSockets and INETSockets) nodes, and (4) UDSocket and
UDSocket nodes.
By removing the redundancy of attributes and events, our
graph representation can significantly compress the original
heterogeneous event data while preserving relevant informa-
tion for intrusion detection. Our experiment results in Sec-
tion V-E demonstrate that the graph model reduces the space
cost significantly.
C. Path Pattern Generation
The graph constructed by the graph modeling component
can be densely connected. Path search in such graphs can be
time costly. To speed up the path searching procedure, GID
allows users to embed the predefined set of valid path patterns
B first.
The path patterns could be defined by the experts according
to their experiences and knowledge. Arguably, it would be
valuable to incorporate experts’ knowledge into the path
pattern generation. Formally, given a graph G(V,E, T ), a
path pattern B is of the format {X1, . . . , Xℓ), where each
Xi(1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ) is either a specific entity (e.g., file install.log)
in V or a specific entity type (e.g., P , which can be mapped
to any system process). The length of B that consists of ℓ
nodes is ℓ. Take the information leakage problem in computer
systems for example, we set each Xi(1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ) as a specific
system entity type, i.e., Xi ∈ {F, P, U, I}. Note that for all
the paths that correspond to information leakage, they must
satisfy that X1 = F and Xℓ = I .
Given a path p ∈ G and a path pattern B of G, let p[i]
and B[i] represent the i-th node in p and B respectively, we
say p is consistent with B, denoted as p ≺ B, if: (1) p and
B have the same length; and (2) for each i, p[i] ∈ B[i] (i.e.,
the specific entity p[i] belongs to the entity type B[i]), we
say B is a valid path pattern if there exists at least one path
p in G s.t. that p ≺ B. For example, the path patterns of
length 3 with the four entity types for information leakage
problem are {F, F, I}, {F, P, I}, {F,U, I} and {F, I, I}. But
the only valid one is {F, P, I}, because only a process node
can connect a file node to a INETSocket node. In this way,
we can extract all the valid patterns from B by searching in
G.
D. Candidate Path Searching
Based on the valid path patterns B, the candidate path
searching component searches for the paths in G that are
consistent with B. Formally, given a set of path patterns B,
the candidate path searching component aims to find the set
of candidate paths C:
C = {p|p ∈ G, ∃B ∈ B s.t. p ≺ B}. (1)
Besides the consistency requirement, we also impose the
following time order constraint on the search procedure,
demanding that for each path that is consistent with B, its
corresponding event sequence must follow the time order.
Formally, a path p = {n1, . . . , nr+1} satisfies the time order
constraint if ∀i ∈ [1, r− 1], there exists t1 ∈ T (ni, ni+1) and
t2 ∈ T (ni+1, ni+2) such that t1 ≤ t2. This condition enforces
the time order in the corresponding event sequences.
A straightforward approach to find all candidate paths is
to apply the path patterns and time order constraints to the
breadth-first search algorithm. If no valid path patterns are
provided, GID would only apply the time order constraints.
One scan of the system event graph G is sufficient to find all
candidate paths. We omit the details here due to the limited
space.
E. Suspicious Path Discovery
It is possible that some candidate paths discovered by the
candidate path searching component are not associated with
abnormal event sequences. Hence it is necessary to distinguish
the suspicious paths that are highly likely to be associated
with abnormal event sequences among a large set of candidate
paths.
A straightforward idea of the suspicious path discovery is
to define their anomaly based on the frequency of the system
entities that are involved. Those paths that involve rarely-used
system entities are considered as suspicious. This is not correct
as many intrusion attacks indeed only involve system entities
that are popularly used in many events. Consider the enterprise
surveillance graph in Figure 2 as an example. The red path
shows a typical insider attack, via which the secret passwd
file is leaked through the vim and httpsd entities. Apparently
vim is the editor process and the httpsd process is a background
daemon process that supports https service. Both entities are
involved in many normal system events. The frequency-based
anomaly approach cannot catch such intrusion attacks.
Continuing the example, we notice that, however, the in-
teraction between vim and passwd entities is abnormal, as
typically the passwd file is accessed by the processes such
as bash, but not by the vim process, which mainly serves as
a file editor.
Therefore, our basic idea is to define the anomaly based on
both the system entities and the interactions among them. Each
path is assigned an anomaly score that quantifies the degree
of anomaly. Next, we discuss how to calculate the anomaly
scores.
First, we assign each system entity two scores, namely,
a sender score and a receiver score. The sender (receiver,
resp.) score measures the amounts of information that is sent
(received, resp.) by the entity. For instance, the /etc/
passwd file has a high sender score but relatively low re-
ceiver score, as it is sent to many processes for access
permission check, but it is rarely modified. In contrast, the
/var/log/install.log file has a high receiver score.
Both sender and receiver scores are computed by performing
random walk on the system event graph G. In particular, given
the graph G, we produce a N ∗N square transition matrix A,
where N is the total number of entities, and
A[i][j] = prob(vi → vj) = |T (vi, vj)|
|
N∑
k=1
|T (vi, vk)||
, (2)
where T (vi, vj) denotes the set of time stamps on which
the event between vi and vj has ever happened.
Intuitively, A[i][j] denotes the probability that the informa-
tion flows from vi to vj in G. We denote A as
A =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P F I U
P 0 AP→F AP→I AP→U
F AF→P 0 0 0
I AI→P 0 0 0
U AU→P 0 0 AU→U
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
, (3)
where 0 represents a zero sub-matrix. Note that the non-zero
sub-matrices of A (Equation 3) only appear between processes
and files, processes and sockets, as well as UDSockets and
UDSockets, but not between processes, because the interaction
between process and process does not come with information
flow. This is what is allowed by the Unix system.
The calculation of sender and receiver scores is adapted
from the reasoning of authorities and hubs [15]. In particular,
let x be the sender score vector, with x(vi) denoting the node
vi’s sender score. Similarly, we use y to denote the receiver
score vector. To calculate each node (entity)’s sender and
receiver scores, first, we assign initial scores. We randomly
generate the initial vector x0 and y0 and iteratively update the
two vectors by the following{
xTm+1 = A ∗ yTm
yTm+1 = A
T ∗ xTm , (4)
where T denotes the matrix transpose. According to Equation
4, an entity vi’s sender score is the summation over the
receiver scores of the entity to which vi sends information
to. The intuition is that if an entity sends information to a
large number entities of high receiver scores, this entity is an
important information sender, and it should have a high sender
score. Similarly, an entity should have a high receiver score
if it receives information from many entities of high sender
scores. As a result, an entity vi’s receiver score is calculated
by accumulating the sender scores of the entities from which
vi receives information.
From Equation 4, we derive{
xTm+1 = (A ∗AT ) ∗ xTm−1
yTm+1 = (A
T ∗A) ∗ yTm−1 . (5)
In Equation 5, we update the two score vectors indepen-
dently. It is easy to see that the learned scores xm and ym
depend on the initial score vector x0 and y0. Different initial
score vectors lead to different learned score values. It is
difficult to choose “good” initial score vector in order to learn
the accurate sender and receiver scores. However, we find an
important property in matrix theory, namely the steady state
property of the matrix [10], to eliminate the effect of x0 and
y0 on the result scores. Specifically, let M be a general square
matrix, and π be a general vector. By repeatedly updating π
with
πTm+1 = M ∗ πTm, (6)
there is a possible convergence state such that πm+1 = πm
for sufficiently large m value. In this case, there is only one
unique πn which can reach the convergence state, i.e.,
πTn = M ∗ πTn . (7)
The convergence state has a good property that the converged
vector is only dependent on the matrix M , but independent
from the initial vector value π0. Based on this property,
we prefer that the sender and receiver vectors can reach
the convergence state. Next, we discuss how to ensure the
convergence.
To reach the convergence state, the matrix M must satisfy
two conditions: irreducibility and aperiodicity [10]. A graph G
is irreducible if and only if for any two nodes vi, vj ∈ V , there
exists at least one path from vi to vj . The period of a node
v ∈ V is the minimum path length from v to v. The graph’s
period is the greatest common divisor of all the node’s period
value. A graph G is aperiodic if and only if it is irreducible
and the period of G is 1.
As our system event graph G is not always a strongly
connected graph, the iteration in Equation (5) can not reach
the convergence state. To ensure convergence, we add a
restart matrix R, which is widely used in random walk on
homogeneous graph [21] and bipartite graph [22]. Typically,
R is a N ∗N square matrix, with each cell value be 1
N
. With
R, we get a new transition matrix A¯:
A¯ = (1− c) ∗A+ c ∗R, (8)
where c is a value between 0 and 1. We call c the restart ratio.
With the restart technique, A¯ is guaranteed to be an irreducible
and aperiodic matrix. By replacing A with A¯ in Equation (5),
we are able to get the converged sender score vector x and
receiver score vector y. We can also control the convergence
rate by controlling the restart rate value. Our experiments show
that the convergence can be reached within 10 iterations.
Given a path p = (v1, . . . , vr+1), based on the sender and
receiver score, the anomaly score is calculated as
Score(p) = 1−NS(p), (9)
where NS(p) is the regularity score of the path calculated by
the following formula:
NS(p) =
r∏
i=1
x(vi) ∗A(vi, vi+1) ∗ y(vi+1), (10)
where x and y are the sender and receiver vectors, and A is
calculated by Equation 3. In Equation (10), x(vi)∗A(vi, vi+1)∗
y(vi+1) measures the normality of the event (edge) that vi
sends information to vi+1. Intuitively, any path that involves
at least one abnormal event is assigned a high anomaly score.
Consider the example of the suspicious path (the red path)
in Figure 2. As the passwd file is rarely accessed by the vim
process, the information transition probability between passwd
and vim is low. Therefore, the event sequence is assigned with
a high anomaly score.
For each path p ∈ C, we calculate the anomaly score by
Equation 9. However, it is easy to see that longer paths tend
to have higher anomaly scores than the shorter paths. To
eliminate the score bias from the path length, we normalize the
anomaly scores so that the scores of paths of different lengths
have the same distribution. Let T denote the normalization
function. We use the Box-Cox power transformation function
[20] as our normalization function. In particular, let Q(r)
denote the set of anomaly scores of r-length paths before
normalization. For each score q ∈ Q(r), we apply
T (q, λ) =
{
qλ−1
λ
: λ 6= 0
log q : λ = 0
(11)
where λ is a normalization parameter. Different λ values
yield different transformed distributions. Our goal is to find
the optimal λ value to make the distribution after normal-
ization as close to the normal distribution as possible (i.e.,
T (Q, λ) ∼ N(µ, σ2)).
Next, we discuss how to compute the optimal λ. First, we
assume that such λ exists to make T (Q, λ) ∼ N(µ, σ2). The
density of a normalized scores is
Prob(T (q, λ)) = exp(−
1
2σ2
(T (q, λ)− µ)2)√
2πσ
. (12)
The profile logarithm likelihood of the normalized distribu-
tion is
L(Q, λ) = −n
2
log(
n∑
i=1
(T (qi, λ) − ¯T (q, λ))2
n
)+(λ−1)
n∑
i=1
log qi,
(13)
where ¯T (q, λ) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 T (qi, λ).
To minimize the margin between the normalized and the
normal distribution, we find the λ that maximizes the log-
likelihood. A possible solution is to take derivatives of L(Q, λ)
on λ, and pick λ that makes ∂L
∂λ
= 0. The suspicious path
discovery component returns those paths of top-k normalized
anomaly scores as suspicious paths.
F. Suspicious Path Validation
To further validate the discovered suspicious paths, we
calculate the t-value between the two groups of paths: all
candidate paths C, and the set of discovered suspicious paths
S.
The t-test returns a confidence score that determines whether
the difference between the two sets of paths is significant.
If the confidence score is greater than 0.9 with p − value
smaller than 0.05, all paths in S are considered as abnormal
paths that are relevant to intrusion attacks. Otherwise, we treat
those paths as normal and do not raise alerts.
The suspicious path validation component prevents
GIDfrom sending false alarms when there is no attack at all.
IV. OPTIMIZED SUSPICIOUS PATH DISCOVERY
The suspicious path discovery method (Section III-E) cal-
culates the anomaly score for each candidate path. However,
the number of candidate paths can be prohibitively large.
It would be desirable if we only need to check a small
number of candidate paths to find those suspicious ones. In
this section, we devise an optimization scheme that addresses
this issue by integrating the threshold algorithm [30] with
our intrusion detection algorithm. The optimization scheme
notably improves the efficiency of suspicious path discovery
(see Section V-C).
Intuitively, the top-k suspicious paths are those candidate
paths with the k largest anomaly score Score(p). We observe
that the anomaly score function has the monotone property.
In particular, given two paths p and p′ of the same length,
where p = (v1, . . . , vℓ+1), and p′ = (v′1, . . . , v′ℓ+1), if x(vi) ≤
x(v′i) and y(vi) ≤ y(v′i) for i ∈ [1, ℓ + 1], it must be true
that NS(p) ≤ NS(p′), thus Score(p) ≥ Score(p′). Based
on the monotone property, we design the procedure shown in
Algorithm 1 to find the top-k suspicious paths, without the
need to calculate the anomaly score of each path.
Our algorithm is adapted from the well-known threshold
algorithm [30]. First, we apply random walk on the graph G
to calculate the two vectors x and y. Second, for each type of
entities, we create two queues sorted in the descendent order
of the sender score and the receiver score respectively. Also,
we sort the edges according the probability A[i][j]. After that,
in each iteration of the WHILE loop, we fetch the entity or
edge with the smallest score from each queue, and identify all
the valid paths that contain these entities and edges. Assume
that there is a path p consisting of these entities and edges,
we calculate Score(p). Apparently Score(p) is the highest
anomaly score for all the paths that are not explored yet. If
Score(p) is no larger than the minimum anomaly score of all
Algorithm 1 Discover top-k suspicious paths
Require: G = (V,E, T ), where V = F ∪ P ∪ U ∪ I , k,
Ensure: SP that contains the top-k suspicious paths of G.
Initialize SP as an empty priority queue;
Apply random walk on G to calculate sender score vector
x and receiver score vector y;
Let FX be the files sorted in descendent order of the sender
score. Let FY be the files sorted in descendent order of the
receiver score.
Create PX , PY , UX , UY , SX and SY in the same way.
Let E′ be the edges sorted descendingly by A[i][j]
while PX , PY , UX , UY , SX , SY and E′ are not empty do
fx = FX .pop(), fy = FY .pop()
px = PX .pop(), py = PY .pop()
ux = UX .pop(), uy = UY .pop()
sx = SX .pop(), sy = SY .pop(), e = E
′.pop()
Assume p is the path involving fx, fy, px, py , ux, uy,
sx, sy, e
′
.
if Score(p) ≤ min{Score(p′)|p′ ∈ SP} then
break
else
Find the path set P such that every path p
confirms to the event sequence pattern and time
constraint, and p involves at least one node in
{fx, fy, px, py, ux, uy, sx, sy} or e′.
for all p ∈ P do
if Score(p) > min{Score(p′)|p′ ∈ SP} then
Insert p into SP
if SP contains k + 1 paths then
Remove the (k+1)-th path from SP .
end if
end if
end for
end if
end while
return SP
paths in the output SP , we stop the iterations and output SP .
Otherwise, we discover the paths P that involve at least one
un-checked entity that is of the highest score in any queue,
and calculate the anomaly scores of these paths. Let the k-
th path pk ∈ SP be the path in SP that is of the minimal
anomaly score. For any path p ∈ P such that Score(p) >
Score(pk), we replace pk with p. By Algorithm 1, we only
need to calculate the anomaly score for a small number of
valid paths to find the top-k suspicious paths. It has proven that
the threshold algorithm can correctly find the top k answers
if the aggregation function is monotone [30]. Therefore, our
optimization algorithm can find exact top-k suspicious paths
efficiently.
In Algorithm 1, we use random walk with restarts to
calculate the sender and receiver scores. The complexity of
the random walk step is O(N2) [31], where N is the number
of entities in the graph. This is because it only needs a constant
number of steps of matrix multiplication to converge. Suppose
that there are C candidate paths, the time complexity to extract
the top-k suspicious ones is O(C), as in the worst case, we
need to calculate the anomaly score for every candidate path.
Thus, the total complexity for Algorithm 1 for the worst case
is O(N2+C). However, due to the early stop condition of the
threshold algorithm, the average-case complexity of Algorithm
1 is O(N2 + C′), where C′ << C.
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experiment Setup
Data Sets. We use a real-world system monitoring data set
in our experiments. The data is collected from an enterprise
network composed of 33 UNIX machines, in a time span
of three consecutive days (i.e., 72 hours). The sheer size
of the data set is around 157 Gigabytes. We consider four
different types of system entities: (1) files, (2) processes, (3)
Unix domain sockets (UDSockets), and (4) Internet sockets
(INETSockets). Each type of entities is associated with a
set of attributes and a unique identifier. Two types of events
(i.e., interactions between the system entities) are considered
in this paper: (1) file accessed by the processes; and (2)
communication between processes. According to the design of
modern operating systems, sockets function as the proxy for
different processes to communicate. Typically, two processes
that execute on the same host communicate with each other via
UDSockets, while processes on different hosts communicate
with each other by INETSockets. Thus, on a single host, the
interactions exist between the following types of entities: (1)
processes and files, (2) processes and processes, (3) processes
and sockets (both UDSockets and INETSockets), and (4)
UDSockets and UDSockets. In total, there are around 440
million system events. These events are related to 410, 166
processes, 1, 797, 501 files, 185, 076 UDSockets and 18, 391
INETSockets.
Testbed and Parameters. We implement our algorithm in
Java and run it on a PC with a 2.5GHz CPU and 8GB RAM.
We set the time window size as one hour, namely we are
interested in catching intrusions which occurs within an hour.
We use the tumbling window model to process the stream data
for simplicity. By default, we set the k = 10 and ℓ = 5.
Regarding the restart ratio c, the detection accuracy reaches a
plateau as c grows from 0.5 to 0.9, which indicates that GID
is insensitive to the choice of c [12]. In the experiment, we
set c = 0.6.
Based on the default setting, for each one-hour time window,
GID returns the top-10 most suspicious event sequences
whose lengths are no larger than 5.
Attack Description. The attack testbed was built by the
Russian hackers. There are 10 different types of attacks with
various lengths from 3 to 5. For each type of attacks, the
hackers tried 10 attack scenarios at different times during
those three days, which results in total 300 event sequences
that correspond to intrusion attacks into the data. All the 10
types of attacks exploit event sequences to transmit sensitive
information to an unauthorized party. Due to the space limits,
here we only list the three major types of attacks.
• Type 1. This attack targets at the /selinux/
mls file, which defines the MLS (Multi-Level Security)
classification of files within the host. In general, the
/selinux/mls file should be kept secret to all users except
for the security administrator, as its leakage exposes the
security rules of a computer system and enables the
attackers to find potential vulnerabilities. By the intrusion
attack, the attacker first exploits the ssh process to access
/selinux/mls file. If the file access is successful, the file
content is sent to an external host (i.e., the attacker).
• Type 2. This attack targets at the /etc/passwd file, which
stores the password digest of all users as well as the user
group information. First, the attacker tries to access the
/etc/passwd file by the gvfs process, which enables easy
access from a remote host via FTP. Then the attacker tries
to send the file via an INETSocket.
• Type 3. In this attack, the remote intruder employs the
bash process to scan a secret file /Documents/secret.xls
created by the user. We assume that the intruder has the
access of the file.
Type 1 and 2 attacks are the essential initial intrusion steps
committed by the Snowden attack, while Type 3 attacks corre-
spond to the botnet attack where the zombie computer gathers
and delivers the unauthorized information to a command and
control (C&C) server.
Baseline. We compare our algorithm with two state-of-the-art
algorithms: NGRAM method [9], and iBOAT method [5]. The
NGRAM method has been widely studied for the identification
of attacks and malicious software. This method builds the
profiles of normal system behaviors from the first 4 hours,
and labels those events in the following hours that do not
appear in the normal profiles as abnormal ones. The iBOAT
method has shown its effectiveness in suspicious trajectory
discovery in GPS traces. It defines the abnormal events as
those whose corresponding paths have low confidence score
in the dataset. In the experiments, we set the threshold value
to be 0.5, which is already the lowest confidence we can set
to ensure the highest detection rate for iBOAT.
B. Detection Accuracy
We also evaluate the detection accuracy of our GID al-
gorithm in catching intrusion attacks. In particular, let h be
the number of injected attacks, and g be the number of
attacks detected by GID. The detection accuracy a = g
h
. We
compare the detection accuracy of GID with the two baseline
approaches. The results are reported in Figure 3. We have
the following findings. First, the detection accuracy of our
approach is high (with overall 85% accuracy, and above 80%
for length-3 and length-4 attacks). The attacks GID misses
to catch are all type-1 attacks. The reason is that the sshd
process involved in the attack has a relatively high sender
score, as it frequently sends packets to other hosts. Thus the
anomaly scores of the paths that involve sshd are not among
the top-k list. In comparison, the detection accuracy of the two
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Fig. 3. Detection accuracy
baseline methods is much lower. In particular, the NGRAM
approach is only able to detect 10% of the length-3 attacks
and 20% of the length-4 attacks, while the iBOAT approach
cannot detect any intrusion attack. We analyze the reason
behind the low detection accuracy of both NGRAM and iBOAT
approaches. First, most of the events in the intrusion attacks
involve popular system entities such as sshd and /etc/passwd.
As these system entities appear in the normal profiles, the
NGRAM algorithm does not consider any path that involves
these system entities as abnormal. Second, all of the simulated
intrusion attacks involve an INETSocket. An INETSocket only
interact with a single process in modern operating systems.
This leads to a high (almost always 1) confidence score of the
event sequences that correspond to the intrusion attack by the
iBOAT approach. Since the iBOAT approach signals an alert
if an event sequence’s confidence score is below a threshold
value, the iBOAT approach takes all the events that involve
any INETSocket as normal sequences.
C. Time Performance
In this section, we compare the time performance of our
optimized suspicious path discovery (OPT) algorithm (see
Section IV) with the original GID algorithm (see Section III),
as well as the two baseline methods. As varying k and ℓ
has little effect on the number of candidate paths, the time
performance of GID remains stable with different k and ℓ.
Therefore, in Figure 4, we only show the time performance
when k = 10 and ℓ = 5. We measure the total detection time
for each hour in the given 72-hour time window, except the
first 4 hours (i.e., training time) for the NGRAM approach.
In Figure 4, we show the total time of the four approaches
and have the following observations. First, overall, our GID
algorithm is very fast. It takes ten minutes at most to analyze
1-hour system events. In most cases, our detection algorithm
finishes in 1 minute. The average overall detection time is
143 seconds for GID and 107 seconds for OPT. Thus, on
average, OPT saves 26% of the total time, compared with
GID using exhaustive search. We also observe that when the
system traffic is high and the number of candidate paths is
large, the advantage of OPT is more obvious. Second, the
detection time reaches its highest value at 10am of the three
days, i.e., the 10-th, 34-th and 58-th hour. This is consistent
with our observation that the heavy traffic of system events
appears around 10am every weekday. We also compare the
performance of GID with the two baseline algorithms. The
average execution time of the NGRAM algorithm is 121
seconds, while the average time of the iBOAT algorithm is 144
seconds. Given the 143 and 107 seconds as the average time
of GID and OPT, GID is comparable with the two baseline
methods and OPT achieves the best time performance. Our
optimization algorithm effectively reduces the suspicious path
discovery time.
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D. Path Score Normalization Result
−3 −1 0 1 2 30
.8
6
0.
92
0.
98
Theoretical Quantiles
Sa
m
pl
e 
Qu
an
til
es
−3 −1 0 1 2 3−
0.
01
0
−
0.
00
2
Theoretical Quantiles
Sa
m
pl
e 
Qu
an
til
es
(a) Before normalization (b) After normalization
Fig. 5. Normalization effect
To measure the impact of normalization to the anomaly
score calculation (see Section III-E), we compare the anomaly
scores before and after normalization. In Figure 5 (a) and
(b), we show the q-q plot for the length-3 paths before and
after normalization, respectively. The figure is plotted using the
quantile of the anomaly score distribution against the uniform
distribution. A reference line is also plotted. Intuitively, if
the points fall approximately along the reference line, the
score distribution is close to uniform. From Figure 5 (a), we
observe a large deviation between the original anomaly score
distribution and the normal distribution. After normalization,
as shown in Figure 5 (b), the transformed distribution is very
close to the normal distribution. We omit the results for length-
4 and length-5 paths as they are very similar.
E. Graph Compactness
The performance of our intrusion detection method highly
relies on our graph data structure (see Section III-B) . In this
section, we measure the size of the constructed graph, aiming
to show its compactness.
Process File INETSocket UDSocket Edge
Avg. 117.3 191.36 0.93 41.42 1668.4
Max 1468 23290 130 6735 58555
(a) Avg/max. number of system entities and edges
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Fig. 6. Graph compactness
In Figure 6 (a), we show the size of our system event graph
in terms of number of system entities and edges. Specifically,
we construct a graph per host per hour. Thus based on the
monitoring data for 33 machines and 3 days, there are 72*33
= 2, 376 graphs. On average, each graph contains around 351
nodes with four different types and less than 1.7K edges. In the
worst case, the graph is still within the size of 60K edges. In
Figure 6 (b), we show the average size of the graphs for each
hour in a 72-hour time window. The number of nodes and
edges are measured by averaging the size of the 33 graphs
(for 33 hosts) in one hour. The results show that the graph
can indeed reduce the space dramatically. One interesting
observation is that the graph reaches its largest size at the
10-th, 34-th and 58-th hour. These 3 peak hours correspond to
the 10am of Day 1, Day 2 and Day 3 respectively. Normally
10am is the busiest time of system logging system as it is
when most employees arrive at office.
F. Distribution of Sender and Receiver Scores
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Fig. 7. Sender and receiver score distribution
In this section, we collect the distribution of the sender
and receiver scores that are computed by the random walk
approach (see Section III-E). The purpose of showing the
distribution is to demonstrate that the anomaly score, which is
computed from the sender and receiver scores, indeed catches
the suspicious interactions between entities. The density dis-
tribution describes the probability that the sender
/receiver score falls into a given range. Figure 7 (a) shows
the density distribution of the sender scores of one specific
host only, as all other hosts have similar score distribution.
It can be seen that the sender scores are of a polarized
distribution. This is because many files such as shared li-
braries (e.g., libpthread.so) and system configuration files
(e.g., /etc/security/capability.conf) are frequently accessed by
various processes. Thus, the sender scores of these files are
relatively high. There also exist daemon processes such as
/bin/dbus-daemon and user files that never function as a infor-
mation sender. This explains why a large fraction of entities
have low sender scores. Conversely, most system entities have
a relatively low receiver score. This is because only a limited
number of processes such as cron regularly scan files and result
in high receiver scores. Meanwhile, the majority of system
entities are files which are seldom updated, leading to the fact
that a large portion of system entities have low receiver scores.
Thus, our sender and receiver score computations truly models
the system behaviors.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Anomaly Detection
Currently there are two types of approaches to intrusion
detection, namely anomaly detection and misuse detection
[13]. Anomaly detection approaches define and characterize
correct/wrong behaviors of the system, while the misuse detec-
tion approaches monitor for explicit patterns, with the intrusion
patterns known in advance. In this paper, we focus on anomaly
detection methods. Based on the data representation, we put
the existing work of anomaly detection into the following two
categories.
Event-based anomaly detection monitors and analyzes the
process events of a computing system. Traditionally, system
calls serve as a good basis for event-based analysis, as short
sequences of system calls are a good discriminator for several
types of intrusions [9]. [9] builds the profile of k-grams from
normal system call traces. An alert is thrown if a new system
call trace is significantly different from the normal profile.
[18] extends this work by taking the system call argument
values into consideration. [17] considers two events with high
posterior probability in the normal training data to be a good
predictive pattern of normal status. In the detection phase, any
violation of such pattern is recognized to be abnormal. In all
these methods, a purely normal and exhaustive set of training
data is essential for constructing a robust normal profile, which
substantially degrades the practicability.
In contrast, graph-based anomaly detection represents the
flow of information in a computer system with a graph and
extracts abnormal substructures from it. [19], [8] discover
those small but rarely-happened substructures in the procedure
of compressing the graph. The embedded minimum description
length principle does not fit the highly dynamic computer
system graph. To overcome this problem, [22] explores the
anomalies based on the community structure in an evolutionary
graph. Because the concentration is limited to the graph struc-
ture, a wealth of information to describe an attack, including
event timestamps and entity attributes, is disregarded. As a
result, the discovered anomalies may not necessarily relate to
a cyber attack.
B. Random Walk
As one of the key techniques in graph-based anomaly
detection, random walk has attracted great attention because
of its high effectiveness and efficiency. There are a lot of
works based on the PageRank algorithm [21]. [21] initiates
the research on random walk by using a random web surfer
model to evaluate the importance of each webpage. If a
random surfer stops at a webpage with high probability after
a sufficiently large time, this page is of great importance.
To avoid the rank sinks such as circles with no outedges,
a restart matrix is taken into consideration to model the
behavior that the surfer periodically gets bored and jumps to
a random page. Following this work, random walk has been
successfully applied to different settings such as personalized
recommendation, similarity search, and information retrieval
[3], [11]. But most of them focus on homogeneous graphs.
Limited papers make a bold attempt to heterogeneous graphs.
Among them, [22] utilizes graph partition and random walk to
detect anomalies in undirected bipartite graph. [1] exploits the
cyclic structure to rank nodes in cyclic multipartite graphs. In
this paper, We extend random walk with restarts to directed
acyclic graph and prove its convergence to a steady-state.
From intrusion detection perspective, recently random walk
has been employed to detect single abnormal hosts/processes.
For example, [6] performs random walk to identify fast-mixing
components in a communication graph between Internet hosts.
These components are highly likely to be P2P bots. [7] uses
random walk to propagate the malicious scores, in order to
discover malicious clients in a ISP network. However, none of
theses existing random walk-based algorithms can be applied
to detect suspicious event sequences. By introducing sender
and receiver scores and integrating with Box-Cox power trans-
formation, we leverage random walk technique to suspicious
paths discovery.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate the problem of detecting intru-
sions, especially suspicious process sequences, in enterprise
system. Different from traditional methods that focus on de-
tecting single entities/events, we propose GID, a graph-based
method to capture the interaction behaviour among different
entities and identify abnormal event sequences. By leveraging
random walk and Box-Cox power transformation, an event
sequence is evaluated to be suspicious if any entity functions
differently from its role. In this way, even the anomalous activ-
ities only involves ordinary entities, we are still able to catch
such anomalies. The efficiency of suspicious path discovery is
further improved by the proposed optimization scheme. Our
model allows users to incorporate their domain knowledge into
the path pattern generation, and also allows users to choose
how many top ranked anomalies to review. We implement
and deploy our approach to a real enterprise security system,
and evaluate the proposed algorithm in extensive experiments.
The experiment results convince us of the effectiveness and
efficiency of our approach.
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